Brad's Perspective

Introduction

Few issues in modern society provoke as much passion, division, and moral certainty as abortion. For decades, it has stood at the crossroads of ethics, medicine, law, and personal autonomy, shaping some of our most heated cultural and political debates. The challenge lies in the collision of two deeply held values: the protection of life and the preservation of individual choice.

My own views on abortion have not been fixed. At times I leaned strongly toward the pro-choice position, convinced a woman’s right to control her own body outweighed nearly all competing considerations. At other times I found myself persuaded by pro-life arguments, recognizing the moral weight of ending a developing life and the unease that grows as medical viability advances. My perspective has shifted over the years, reflecting the difficulty of reconciling competing values rather than a simple allegiance to one side.

This essay does not aim to convert anyone to my personal view. Instead, it seeks to examine the main arguments on both sides of the debate, explain the position I hold today, and outline a proposal for compromise. Underlying it all is a larger point: personal beliefs and public law do not always align, and on an issue as complex as abortion, they may never fully converge.

The Broader Debate

Abortion has remained controversial for so long in part because both sides ground their positions in principles that are deeply compelling. Each sees itself as defending something fundamental, whether it is the dignity of life or the freedom of choice. Each side appeals to values most people hold in some form: freedom, equality, health, dignity, and life itself. This is why the issue resists easy resolution. Any meaningful compromise must begin by recognizing the validity of concerns on both sides, even when they point in different directions. Understanding these arguments in their strongest form is essential before considering any personal stance or policy solution.

The Arguments in Favor

Arguments in favor of abortion rights often begin with the principle of autonomy. Central to this perspective is the belief that individuals must retain control over their own bodies, including decisions about reproduction. The ability to choose whether to carry a pregnancy is not seen as a secondary privilege, but as a fundamental expression of liberty. Without this control, advocates argue, women cannot achieve true equality in society. Autonomy in reproductive matters is viewed as directly connected to broader freedoms—professional advancement, economic stability, and the ability to direct one’s own life. From this foundation, the case for abortion rights branches into several reinforcing arguments, explored below.

Public Health

Supporters of abortion rights often argue from a public health perspective. They contend that restricting abortion does not end the practice but instead pushes it outside formal medical systems, where procedures become less safe. According to this view, unsafe abortion exposes women to higher risks of infection, infertility, and death. Proponents frequently cite reports from the World Health Organization, which has identified unsafe abortion as a significant contributor to maternal mortality in countries with restrictive laws (World Health Organization, “Preventing Unsafe Abortion,” 2021).

Advocates also point to historical data from the United States. They argue that after abortion was legalized in 1973, hospitalizations from unsafe procedures declined dramatically. The Guttmacher Institute has documented how the number of women admitted to hospitals for septic or incomplete abortions fell sharply in the years immediately following Roe v. Wade (Guttmacher Institute, “Abortion Worldwide Report,” 2017). In this argument, legalization improves safety by placing abortion under medical supervision.

Pro-choice claims also draw on international comparisons. Researchers note that countries with legal abortion combined with widespread contraceptive access often report lower maternal mortality and, over time, fewer abortions overall (Sedgh et al., “Induced Abortion: Incidence and Trends Worldwide from 1995 to 2008,” The Lancet, 2012). From this perspective, legal abortion is not framed only as a matter of choice but as a safeguard for public health.

The central claim is that restrictions may reduce reported procedures but do not remove the demand for abortion. Legalization, by contrast, is presented as a way to make procedures safer while also building a broader framework of reproductive healthcare that can reduce the overall need for abortion..

Circumstances of Conception

Another common line of argument in favor of abortion rights centers on the circumstances under which a pregnancy begins. Supporters contend that when conception occurs through rape or incest, forcing a woman to carry the pregnancy compounds trauma with additional harm. According to this view, requiring a victim of sexual violence to give birth imposes a punishment that extends far beyond the original crime. Advocacy groups and researchers often point to testimony from survivors who describe the physical and psychological toll of carrying an unwanted pregnancy in these circumstances (American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, “Access to Abortion for Victims of Sexual Assault,” 2021).

Pro-choice advocates also extend this reasoning to cases not involving coercion but marked by hardship. They argue that many women who seek abortion already have children and face economic, medical, or personal circumstances that make raising another child unsustainable. Studies by the Guttmacher Institute have found that financial instability is one of the most frequently cited reasons for seeking abortion, along with the need to care for existing children (Finer et al., “Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions,” Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health, 2005). From this standpoint, abortion is presented not as an act of convenience but as a response to circumstances in which continuing a pregnancy could create lasting harm to the woman, her family, and her dependents.

Proponents further claim that denying abortion in such circumstances not only affects the woman but also has broader social consequences. Children born into situations of poverty or instability may face reduced access to healthcare, education, and opportunities. Supporters argue that abortion access can, in some cases, prevent cycles of hardship from deepening across generations.

The central claim in this line of reasoning is that circumstances matter. While abortion opponents often stress universal principles, pro-choice advocates maintain that the context of conception—whether shaped by violence, coercion, or hardship—should weigh heavily in determining whether abortion remains available. From this perspective, reproductive choice functions as a safeguard against compounding harm in situations where pregnancy begins under difficult or unjust conditions..

Principle of Equality

A further argument advanced by supporters of abortion rights focuses on equality. The central claim is that without the option of abortion, women bear a disproportionate burden in society, one tied to biology rather than choice. Pregnancy and childbirth interrupt education, limit professional opportunities, and create financial obligations that men do not experience in the same way. From this perspective, abortion access is framed as essential for leveling the playing field between men and women.

Advocates frequently cite data on educational and economic outcomes to support this claim. Research has found that women denied abortions are more likely to experience long-term poverty and less likely to achieve professional or academic goals compared to those who obtained abortions (Foster et al., “Socioeconomic Outcomes of Women Who Receive and Women Who Are Denied Wanted Abortions in the United States,” American Journal of Public Health, 2018). Supporters argue that these disparities illustrate how restrictions perpetuate structural inequality by limiting women’s ability to exercise the same freedom of life planning as men.

Pro-choice advocates also argue that these burdens are racialized. Women of color, especially Black and Hispanic women in the United States, face higher rates of unintended pregnancy and maternal mortality (Guttmacher Institute, “Abortion in the United States,” 2023). According to this perspective, abortion restrictions not only compound existing disadvantages but also reinforce systemic racism by denying reproductive autonomy to the very groups most affected by poverty and health inequities. Some go further, claiming that the structure of abortion law and policy has been shaped in ways that intentionally keep marginalized communities from advancing economically and socially. In this view, restricting abortion is not a neutral policy choice but a mechanism for maintaining racial and class hierarchies.

The central claim here is that abortion rights are inseparable from both gender and racial equality. Supporters maintain that without abortion access, legal guarantees of equality lose much of their practical force. From this perspective, abortion is not treated as an isolated medical procedure but as a cornerstone of justice — necessary to prevent laws from locking women, particularly women of color, into cycles of poverty and disadvantage..

Role of Government

A final argument advanced by supporters of abortion rights concerns the proper role of government in a pluralistic society. Advocates acknowledge that abortion raises moral questions, but they argue those questions should not be settled through law in a way that enforces a single worldview. From this perspective, the government should guarantee space for individuals to act according to their own conscience rather than impose one moral judgment on everyone.

Pro-choice advocates often link this claim to constitutional principles of liberty and privacy. They argue that reproductive decisions fall within the sphere of personal autonomy the state should protect, not regulate. Court decisions such as Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) are frequently cited by supporters to show how the U.S. legal system once recognized abortion as part of a broader right to privacy. Although these precedents have since been overturned, advocates contend the reasoning behind them remains valid: reproductive choice should remain a matter of individual decision-making rather than legislative command.

Supporters also point out that in diverse societies, people disagree deeply about when life begins and how competing values of autonomy and life should be balanced. They claim that legislating one answer to these questions risks privileging a particular religious or philosophical tradition over others, undermining principles of pluralism and equal citizenship. From this standpoint, access to abortion is framed not only as a health issue but as a safeguard against government overreach into matters of conscience.

The central claim here is that abortion should remain a private decision because the state has no legitimate authority to enforce a single moral judgment on such a contested issue. Proponents argue that protecting reproductive choice is consistent with the broader democratic principle of allowing individuals to govern their own lives, even when their decisions conflict with the moral convictions of others..

The Arguments Against

Those who oppose abortion advance their arguments from a foundation of moral conviction, often beginning with the claim that abortion ends a human life. From this starting point, opponents develop a series of claims that extend beyond the individual act to questions of law, society, and justice. They argue not only that abortion violates the sanctity of life, but also that it undermines the rights of the unborn, erodes respect for human dignity, and contributes to broader social harms. These arguments are frequently grounded in religious belief, but they are also expressed in secular terms that appeal to principles of consistency, equality, and protection of the vulnerable.

Opponents frame their case through several main themes. They begin with the sanctity of life, contending that human existence deserves protection from conception and that the unborn should be considered rights-bearing entities. They raise ethical concerns about viability and late-term abortions, arguing that advances in medicine make such procedures increasingly difficult to justify. They invoke race and history, claiming that abortion has roots in eugenics and continues to disproportionately affect minority communities. Finally, they appeal to societal values, maintaining that abortion erodes responsibility, weakens family bonds, and signals a broader cultural disregard for life.

Together, these claims form a comprehensive argument against abortion, one that portrays it not as an isolated private decision but as a moral wrong with consequences for individuals and society alike.

Sanctity of Life

Opponents of abortion frequently begin with the claim that human life is sacred and begins at conception. From this perspective, the embryo or fetus is not a potential life but an actual life at its earliest stage of development. Supporters of this view argue that the genetic uniqueness established at conception marks the start of a new human being, distinct from the mother. For them, the moral weight of protecting life applies from this point forward, regardless of whether the being is viable outside the womb.

This claim is often reinforced through religious traditions. The Catholic Church, for example, has consistently taught that life begins at conception and must be protected from that moment (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2270). Evangelical Christian organizations have advanced similar positions, frequently citing biblical passages such as Psalm 139, which speaks of God knowing a person in the womb. But the argument is also expressed in secular terms. Legal and philosophical works, such as Robert George and Christopher Tollefsen’s Embryo: A Defense of Human Life (2008), contend that the human embryo is a complete, albeit immature, member of the human species and should therefore be granted moral and legal consideration.

Flowing from this position is the claim that the unborn should be recognized as rights-bearing entities. Opponents point to laws in the United States that already acknowledge fetal status in certain contexts. The federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, for instance, makes it a separate crime to harm or kill a fetus during the commission of an assault on a pregnant woman. Dozens of states have similar fetal homicide statutes, some extending protection to any stage of pregnancy. Opponents argue that if the law recognizes the fetus as a victim of crime in these cases, denying that recognition in abortion undermines consistency and fairness.

The core of this argument is categorical rather than circumstantial: abortion ends a human life. Opponents contend that society does not accept the taking of life after birth for reasons of hardship, poverty, or inconvenience, and therefore should not accept it before birth. For them, abortion represents a direct violation of the sanctity of life and a failure to extend legal protections to the most vulnerable. In this view, respecting the sanctity of life from conception is essential to any society that claims to uphold universal human rights.

Viability and Late-Term Abortions

Opponents of abortion argue that once a fetus can survive outside the womb with medical support, abortion is no longer morally defensible. Viability is treated as a threshold: before this point, the fetus depends entirely on the mother, but after it, the fetus is capable of continuing life independently. Ending a pregnancy beyond viability is framed as ending the life of a being who could survive on its own.

Critics point to advances in neonatal medicine that have moved the viability threshold earlier than in past decades. In the 1970s, viability was commonly placed around 28 weeks of gestation; today, premature infants have survived after birth at 22 weeks or earlier (Rysavy et al., “Between-Hospital Variation in Treatment and Outcomes in Extremely Preterm Infants,” New England Journal of Medicine, 2015). Opponents claim that as medicine demonstrates the survival of younger fetuses, the case for protecting them strengthens.

Public opinion is also used to support this argument. Surveys show that support for abortion decreases as pregnancy progresses. A 2022 Gallup poll found that while most Americans support abortion in the first trimester, only 36 percent support it in the second and 20 percent in the third (Gallup, “Abortion,” 2022). Opponents interpret this as evidence that late-term procedures are seen as morally distinct, even among those who accept abortion early in pregnancy.

They also point to inconsistencies in law and medicine. Infants born prematurely at 24 weeks may receive intensive care in neonatal units, while fetuses at the same stage can be aborted where the law permits. Critics argue that this creates a contradiction: the same being is treated as a patient in one context and as disposable in another.

The claim is that abortion after viability undermines respect for life at the stage when medicine and society recognize its independent existence. For opponents, limiting abortion after viability is both a matter of consistency and a recognition of the dignity owed to a fetus capable of survival outside the womb.

Race, Eugenics, and Social Justice

Opponents of abortion advance claims rooted in history and racial justice. They argue abortion in the United States has been influenced by eugenic motives, particularly in its impact on communities of color. This reasoning often points to Margaret Sanger, founder of Planned Parenthood, who promoted birth control as part of a broader social reform movement in the early 20th century. While Sanger described her mission as one of women’s health and family planning, critics emphasize her association with the eugenics movement, which sought to limit reproduction among groups considered “unfit.” From this perspective, abortion is linked to a worldview that regarded certain populations as less worthy of life.

Opponents extend this argument to contemporary patterns. They point to statistics showing higher abortion rates among Black and Hispanic women compared to white women (Guttmacher Institute, “Abortion in the United States,” 2023). Critics argue these disparities are not only the result of economic inequality but also of a system that has long steered vulnerable populations toward limiting reproduction rather than supporting families. The placement of abortion clinics in predominantly minority neighborhoods is frequently cited as evidence of this dynamic. Some opponents claim this pattern functions less as healthcare access and more as population control, reducing the growth of communities already burdened by poverty and discrimination.

The discrimination argument goes further: opponents claim abortion reflects a broader societal devaluation of minority lives. Instead of addressing structural barriers such as inadequate healthcare, limited economic opportunity, or poor educational access, abortion is offered as a response to pregnancies in disadvantaged communities. Pro-life groups such as the Radiance Foundation, for example, have argued that abortion providers “target” African American communities by concentrating services in minority neighborhoods (Radiance Foundation, “TooManyAborted.com” campaign, 2010). From this perspective, abortion policies do not resolve inequality but perpetuate it by directing minority women toward ending pregnancies rather than empowering them to raise children in stable conditions.

The claim, then, is that abortion has been shaped by eugenic motives and continues to reflect patterns of racial discrimination. For critics, the disproportionate impact on communities of color, combined with historical associations to population control, suggest abortion is not a neutral medical service but a practice entangled with inequality and injustice.

Societal Values

Opponents of abortion argue from the perspective of societal values. They claim permitting abortion weakens respect for life and reshapes cultural attitudes in ways that harm both family and community.

One line of reasoning emphasizes personal responsibility. Critics contend that by allowing abortion, society teaches pregnancy and parenthood are optional obligations that can be set aside when inconvenient. From this perspective, abortion erodes the expectation that sexual activity carries natural consequences, including responsibility for children. Pro-life advocates frequently point to adoption as an alternative that addresses unwanted pregnancies without ending life (National Right to Life Committee, “Adoption Instead of Abortion,” 2020).

Another claim is that abortion undermines the family as an institution. Opponents argue widespread acceptance of abortion shifts social norms away from protecting children and supporting mothers toward normalizing termination. Some contend this weakens cultural commitments to family stability and shared responsibility for raising children (Wilcox, “The Evolution of Pro-Life Arguments,” Society, 2012).

A broader version of this argument focuses on the so-called “slippery slope.” Critics maintain that if society permits the taking of life before birth, it sets a precedent for devaluing life at other stages. They often link abortion to later debates over euthanasia and assisted suicide, suggesting a cultural pattern in which vulnerable populations are treated as expendable (Callahan, “Abortion and the Logic of Moral Disintegration,” Commonweal, 1970).

The claim is that abortion shapes how society values life and responsibility. Opponents argue normalizing abortion weakens moral commitments to family, erodes cultural respect for life, and risks expanding a mindset in which some lives are treated as less worthy of protection.

Points of Contention

The arguments for and against abortion converge on several key issues where each side appeals to the same values but draws opposite conclusions. In this section, the claims will be set side by side to show where they align, where they diverge, and how they directly conflict.

Public Health

Supporters of abortion rights claim legalization protects women’s health. They argue restrictions do not end abortion but drive it into unsafe conditions that result in infection, infertility, and death. They point to data showing declines in hospitalizations from septic abortion after Roe v. Wade (Guttmacher Institute, “Abortion Worldwide Report,” 2017) and to global studies linking restrictive laws with higher maternal mortality (World Health Organization, “Preventing Unsafe Abortion,” 2021). From this perspective, legal abortion is presented as a safeguard for life and health.

Opponents counter that abortion itself harms women and should also be understood as a threat to the health of the fetus. They cite studies alleging higher rates of depression, anxiety, and substance abuse among women who undergo abortions (Coleman, “Abortion and Mental Health,” British Journal of Psychiatry, 2011). They also point to the risk of medical complications such as hemorrhage or infection. Extending the definition of health to the unborn, critics argue abortion cannot be framed as healthcare at all, since its purpose is to end a developing life.

The contention lies in how health is defined. Pro-choice advocates focus on the woman’s safety in avoiding unsafe procedures, while pro-life critics insist public health must include the fetus. Each side claims the mantle of health, but they assign it to different patients.

Circumstances of Conception

Supporters of abortion rights argue the circumstances of conception matter profoundly. They claim women who become pregnant as a result of rape or incest should not be forced to carry a pregnancy born of violence. To do so, they argue, compounds trauma and denies the victim control over her own body. Supporters extend this reasoning to cases of hardship: women who lack financial stability, healthcare, or support may be unable to raise another child without severe consequences for themselves and their families. Research showing most women seeking abortions cite economic reasons reinforces this claim (Finer et al., “Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions,” Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health, 2005). From this perspective, abortion provides a humane response to situations of coercion or deep hardship.

Opponents respond in different ways. Many acknowledge the gravity of rape and incest and concede abortion may be permissible in these circumstances, particularly in early pregnancy. Polling suggests a majority of Americans who identify as pro-life support these exceptions (Gallup, “Abortion,” 2022). Others take a categorical position, arguing the fetus is innocent of the crime or hardship that led to conception and should not lose its life because of the manner of its origin. Across both views, opponents emphasize that abortion for reasons of poverty, inconvenience, or family planning is not morally justified. Adoption is often presented as a better path, allowing the child to live while relieving the mother of parental responsibility (National Right to Life Committee, “Adoption Instead of Abortion,” 2020).

The contention is whether circumstances alter the moral weight of abortion. Pro-choice advocates argue they do, because requiring women to continue pregnancies from violence or hardship inflicts additional harm. Pro-life critics divide: many concede narrow exceptions for rape and incest, while others reject exceptions entirely. But across the spectrum, opponents maintain that economic hardship or difficult circumstances do not outweigh the moral duty to preserve the life of the fetus.

Equality and Discrimination

Supporters of abortion rights argue access is essential for gender equality. They claim pregnancy and childbirth impose unique burdens on women that men do not share, affecting education, career advancement, and economic stability. Without the ability to end an unwanted pregnancy, they argue, women are placed at a structural disadvantage. Research supports this claim: women denied abortions are more likely to fall into poverty and less likely to achieve educational and professional goals compared to women who receive abortions (Foster et al., “Socioeconomic Outcomes of Women Who Receive and Women Who Are Denied Wanted Abortions in the United States,” American Journal of Public Health, 2018). From this perspective, abortion is a necessary tool for leveling the social and economic playing field.

Supporters also extend the equality claim to race. They argue women of color face higher rates of unintended pregnancy and maternal mortality, reflecting longstanding inequities in healthcare and economic access (Guttmacher Institute, “Abortion in the United States,” 2023). Denying abortion, they claim, compounds these inequities by limiting reproductive autonomy where it is needed most.

Opponents approach equality and discrimination from the opposite direction. They argue abortion itself reflects discriminatory motives and outcomes. Critics point to Margaret Sanger’s involvement in the eugenics movement, citing statements such as her warning in 1939 that Planned Parenthood must avoid giving the impression of wanting “to exterminate the Negro population” (Letter to Dr. Clarence Gamble, Dec. 10, 1939). For them, this history raises doubts about the racial intent behind abortion policy. They also note that abortion rates are disproportionately high in Black and Hispanic communities and argue this pattern reflects systemic steering of minority women toward limiting reproduction rather than supporting families. Campaigns such as the Radiance Foundation’s Too Many Aborted highlight this claim by framing abortion as a form of population control targeting minority communities.

The contention is whether abortion alleviates or perpetuates inequality. Pro-choice advocates argue it is essential for women’s autonomy and racial justice, while pro-life critics argue it has been shaped by eugenic motives and continues to function as a tool of discrimination against the very communities it purports to serve.

Government and Law

Supporters of abortion rights argue the government should not impose one moral perspective on a diverse society. They claim abortion is a matter of personal conscience that belongs within the sphere of individual liberty. Court precedents such as Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) are often cited as recognition that reproductive choice falls under constitutional protections of privacy and liberty. Although both precedents were overturned by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022), pro-choice advocates maintain the underlying principle remains valid: government should not dictate private reproductive decisions.

Opponents counter that government has a duty to protect life, including unborn life. They point to Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022), in which the Supreme Court held the Constitution does not confer a right to abortion and returned regulatory authority to the states. For critics of abortion, Dobbs corrected what they view as decades of judicial overreach by Roe and Casey, restoring the ability of legislatures to act on behalf of the unborn. Opponents also note that legal systems already recognize the fetus as a victim in other contexts, citing the federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 and state-level fetal homicide laws. From their perspective, abortion is inconsistent with these protections, since it allows the intentional ending of a life otherwise shielded by law.

The contention is whether abortion belongs within the domain of personal liberty, shielded from government intervention, or within the government’s duty to protect life. Pro-choice advocates argue law should preserve freedom of conscience in reproductive decisions, while pro-life critics argue law must consistently defend life, including life in the womb.

Viability and Late-Term Abortion

Supporters of abortion rights emphasize that decisions about pregnancy should remain with the woman, but many acknowledge viability as a meaningful threshold. Polling shows support for abortion rights is strongest in the first trimester and falls significantly later in pregnancy (Gallup, 2022). Some pro-choice advocates argue abortion should be restricted after viability except when the mother’s health or life is at risk, or in cases of severe fetal abnormality. Others contend abortion access should extend throughout pregnancy, though they note late-term procedures are rare and often involve complex medical or personal circumstances (American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, “Facts Are Important: Understanding Abortion Later in Pregnancy,” 2019). From this perspective, even those who defend broad access often frame late-term abortion as an exception rather than the norm.

Opponents focus on viability as a decisive moral line. They argue that once a fetus can survive outside the womb, it should be recognized as a human life entitled to protection. Advances in neonatal medicine, which have made survival possible earlier in pregnancy, reinforce this claim (Rysavy et al., New England Journal of Medicine, 2015). Critics also highlight the inconsistency they see in treating a premature infant at 24 weeks as a patient in one context while permitting abortion at the same stage in another.

The contention is whether viability should mark the point at which abortion access ends, with only narrow exceptions, or whether discretion should remain primarily with the mother even at this stage. Supporters divide on where to draw the line, but many accept limits after viability; opponents see viability as the point at which society’s duty to protect life overrides individual choice.

Societal Values

Supporters of abortion rights frame access as affirming values of autonomy, dignity, and equality. They argue a society that respects freedom must allow individuals to make private decisions about reproduction, even when others find those decisions morally objectionable. In this view, abortion safeguards the principle that personal liberty includes control over one’s body and life trajectory. Some also contend that supporting reproductive choice reflects compassion, since it prevents families from being forced into circumstances they cannot sustain.

Opponents argue abortion undermines the very values supporters claim it protects. They contend it erodes responsibility by teaching that pregnancy can be ended if inconvenient, weakening cultural norms of accountability and commitment to children. They also argue abortion destabilizes family life by framing children as optional rather than integral to family structure. More broadly, critics maintain abortion sets a precedent for devaluing life at other stages. They connect abortion to debates over assisted suicide and euthanasia, claiming a society that permits abortion fosters a mindset in which vulnerable populations—the elderly, the disabled, the terminally ill—may also be treated as expendable (Callahan, “Abortion and the Logic of Moral Disintegration,” Commonweal, 1970).

The contention is whether abortion strengthens society by affirming freedom and compassion, or weakens it by eroding responsibility and diminishing respect for life. Supporters emphasize values of choice and dignity, while opponents emphasize values of responsibility, family, and the consistent protection of human life.

Summing Up the Debate

The arguments surrounding abortion are powerful because they are rooted in values almost everyone holds in some form—life, freedom, dignity, responsibility, and equality. Each side raises serious questions about how those values should be balanced, and neither set of claims can be dismissed without thought. The pro-choice case forces consideration of the costs to women’s health, autonomy, and opportunity if abortion is restricted. The pro-life case forces consideration of the moral status of the unborn and the responsibilities a society bears toward its most vulnerable members.

What emerges is not a dispute between people who care about life and those who do not, or between those who value freedom and those who reject it. Rather, the debate persists because both sides invoke genuine concerns that reach to the core of how society defines itself. These questions are not easily answered, and attempts to reduce them to slogans miss their depth. The durability of the conflict is itself evidence of how much is at stake, and how difficult it is to reconcile principles that carry weight on both sides.

My Position

Having examined the major arguments on both sides, I turn now to my own view. I know some will argue that, as a man, I cannot truly have a say on abortion. I acknowledge I will never feel what it is like to carry a child or experience the physical and emotional burdens of pregnancy. Still, I can witness it, and I can understand intellectually the weight of responsibility it places on women who must live it. Recognizing that difference matters, but it does not mean men should be excluded from the conversation. The moral and legal questions raised by abortion affect all of society, not only women. For that reason, I believe it is possible to approach the issue with humility—acknowledging the limits of my own experience—while still offering a perspective on how we, as a society, should respond.

My own perspective has shifted considerably over time. As a young adult, I considered myself firmly pro-choice. I saw abortion opponents mostly as angry protestors outside clinics or as extremists in the news who resorted to violence, and I dismissed them as monsters. Later, after becoming active in church life, I moved to the opposite pole and embraced the pro-life position. At that time, I opposed abortion in nearly all cases, with the sole exception of protecting the life of the mother. Even then, I never accepted violence or public shaming as tactics, but I did view abortion itself as unacceptable in every other circumstance.

In time, I came to see both of these stances as incomplete. The absolute rejection of one side and the absolute embrace of the other failed to account for the depth of the competing claims. In recent years, I have sought a position that acknowledges the force of arguments on both sides. To me, nearly every argument—whether about health, social outcomes, or historical motives—ultimately traces back to two foundations: the woman’s right to decide what happens with her body, and the rights of the unborn once it is regarded as a distinct entity. I do not reject the other arguments as unimportant, but I view them as reflections of these deeper principles. What follows is how I now weigh those principles and how that balance has led me to a stance I believe lies between the extremes.

At its core, I see abortion as a conflict between two rights: the woman’s right to control her own body and the unborn child’s claim to life. This conflict is unlike any other, not only because one life is physically dependent on another, but because pregnancy is the unique situation in which one life comes into existence inside another. That fact makes abortion different from any other issue of rights or responsibilities. A newborn, for example, is dependent on parents for survival, but that dependence can be met by others if the parents cannot or will not provide it. An ill or disabled person may rely on caregivers, but society can step in to share or assume that role. Pregnancy alone creates a situation where the existence of one life is inseparable from the body of another, and where rights cannot be easily separated. This uniqueness explains both the emotional intensity and the intractability of the debate.

For this reason, I find it essential to distinguish between biological life and legal personhood. I believe life begins at conception in the biological sense. From that moment forward, a genetically distinct human organism exists, carrying its own blueprint of growth. To me, this is undeniable. Yet recognizing biological life is not the same as saying society must treat that life as an independent bearer of rights. In its earliest stages, the embryo cannot survive outside the mother. Its existence is wholly dependent on her body, and that dependence is unlike any other obligation society imposes. No person, however great the need, has ever been granted a legal claim to occupy and use another’s body without consent. We do not force people to donate blood or organs, even when doing so could save a life. To impose such a requirement in the case of early pregnancy would create a precedent that runs against every other principle of bodily autonomy.

The problem with grounding rights in dependence alone becomes clearer if we imagine it outside the context of pregnancy. Suppose society deemed a species so valuable that citizens could be required to host it in their bodies to preserve it. However much value might be ascribed to that species, most would reject the idea that the state could force such an obligation. Pregnancy is, of course, a natural and profoundly human process, not an external imposition. But the comparison illustrates the danger of treating dependence by itself as the source of legal duty. It would allow biology alone to override the principle that one’s body cannot be conscripted without consent. However much I personally believe life begins at conception, I cannot accept that the state should enforce this belief by requiring women to continue pregnancies in the earliest stages.

The moral landscape shifts at viability. Viability is not a fixed point—it changes with advances in medical care—but it marks the stage where survival outside the womb becomes realistically possible. What makes this stage decisive is not that the fetus suddenly becomes less dependent in a general sense—infants remain dependent long after birth—but that its dependence on the mother’s body specifically comes to an end. Before viability, the fetus is physically and biologically inseparable from her; it cannot survive without continuous use of her body. After viability, by contrast, the fetus can exist apart from her, however fragile that existence may be. This distinction matters. A newborn requires food, shelter, and protection, but those needs can be met by many people. A pre-viable fetus, by contrast, requires one thing only: continued residence inside the woman’s body, without which it cannot live. Viability marks the point at which that unique and absolute dependence ceases, and where the unborn’s claim to life can be recognized independently of the woman’s obligation to sustain it.

For me, this means that after viability, abortion should not be understood as the deliberate ending of life. The language we use here matters. To describe it as “ending” or “destroying” overlooks the fact that the fetus, at this stage, has reached a point of potential independence. A more accurate way to frame it is as the mother’s decision to withdraw her physical support. She may choose not to continue the pregnancy, but that choice should not automatically entail the death of the child. Medically, the proper response would be to deliver the fetus and make every effort to sustain its life. Some will argue this is only a distinction in words, but I see it as a substantive moral and legal difference. It recognizes that once the unborn is capable of surviving apart from the mother, society has a duty to treat it not simply as part of her body, but as a life in its own right.

In practical terms, this means post-viability abortions should take the form of premature delivery rather than procedures designed to end the fetus’s life. In many cases, the child may not survive long even with medical intervention, but the attempt should be made. This aligns with how we already treat premature infants delivered in neonatal units. No guarantee of survival is required before we recognize their claim to care. The point is not that medicine can always succeed, but that the child is owed the chance to live once survival is possible without continued residence in the mother’s body.

There must always be an exception when the mother’s life is in danger. If pregnancy places her at serious risk of death, then ending it is not the destruction of life but an act of self-defense. The law has always recognized that the right to preserve one’s life justifies actions that would otherwise be impermissible. The same principle applies here. This is not an escape clause but an acknowledgment of the mother’s equal humanity. A society that insists on protecting unborn life cannot do so by sacrificing the life of the woman who sustains it.

There are also cases where medical judgment is uncertain. Doctors may not be able to say with certainty whether continuing a pregnancy will kill the mother, but they may see rising and unacceptable risks. In such circumstances, I believe the mother’s physical health must take precedence. If the law is to err, it should err on the side of the woman whose survival is already established and whose rights cannot be contingent on medical guesswork. To decide otherwise would invert the moral order, treating a dependent life as more valuable than the life on which it relies.

This framework does not remove the moral weight of abortion, nor does it make the choices easier. What it does is provide a consistent way to think about the competing rights at stake. Before viability, the woman’s right to control her body outweighs the dependent claim of the embryo or fetus, because the fetus cannot exist apart from her. After viability, the unborn has reached a stage where independence is possible, and society has a duty to protect it, so long as this duty does not override the mother’s right to survive. This approach respects both principles. It affirms the woman’s autonomy, acknowledges the unborn’s life, and recognizes the singular nature of pregnancy as the only situation in which one human life begins inside another.

Objections

Any position on abortion will draw objections, and mine is no exception. Because the issue touches such deep values, neither side is likely to find full satisfaction in a compromise. Supporters of abortion rights will say my reliance on viability is arbitrary and fails to secure full autonomy for women. Opponents of abortion will say acknowledging life at conception but permitting abortion before viability is a contradiction that devalues human life. Beyond both camps, others will argue that no legal compromise can resolve a moral conflict this profound.

I believe these objections deserve more than a passing acknowledgment. They should be set out in their strongest form and considered carefully. Some of them I can answer directly, while others highlight tensions I accept but believe must be lived with if we are to find common ground. What follows is an attempt to anticipate the most serious objections from each perspective and to show how my position stands in light of them.

From the Pro-Choice Perspective

Those who support abortion rights may find several aspects of my position troubling. From their perspective, the central issue is a woman’s right to make decisions about her own body, and any limit placed on that right risks undermining the principle of autonomy. They may object that the standard I propose—viability—rests on unstable ground, or that my framework uses language that disguises the reality of abortion. Others will argue that exceptions I allow for the mother’s health are too narrow, or that my reliance on independence as a marker for rights ignores the broader burdens of pregnancy and childbirth. Still others may say my approach invites unequal enforcement or lays the groundwork for future restrictions.

In what follows, I will address these concerns as directly as I can, not to dismiss them but to show how my framework withstands them or at least why I believe it remains reasonable in light of them.

“Viability is an arbitrary and shifting line.”

A central objection is that viability cannot serve as a clear or principled standard because it changes with time, place, and technology. Fifty years ago, survival outside the womb was rare before 28 weeks; today, survival is possible closer to 22 or 23 weeks in advanced hospitals. In poorer regions, viability may come weeks later because neonatal care is limited. If rights depend on viability, then two fetuses at the same stage of development might be treated differently depending on geography or resources. Critics argue this makes viability an unstable and inequitable legal threshold, too tied to circumstance to carry the moral weight my position gives it.

I recognize this as a serious concern. Viability is not an absolute biological marker but a threshold influenced by science. Yet this does not mean it is meaningless. The law often works with standards that evolve as knowledge and practice evolve. What counts as “disability,” “medical negligence,” or “cruel and unusual punishment” shifts with time and context, but these categories still function in law. Viability works in a similar way. Its importance lies not in being fixed forever but in marking the first point at which the unborn is no longer inseparably tied to the mother’s body. However variable the exact week may be, the principle remains: before viability, the unborn cannot live apart from the woman; after viability, it can. That distinction provides a workable basis for balancing rights, even if the line is imperfect.

“Withdrawal of support is just semantics.”

Another objection is that my framing of post-viability abortion as the “withdrawal of support” rather than the “ending of life” is only a matter of words. Critics argue that in most cases, when a pregnancy is terminated after viability, the fetus does not survive. Whether the procedure involves destruction in utero or delivery followed by death outside the womb, the outcome is the same. To call it “withdrawal of support” may appear to soften the moral weight of the act without changing its substance. From this view, my framework is accused of disguising reality behind careful language.

This objection carries force, because language can be used to obscure as well as to clarify. But I do not believe this is a semantic game. The distinction lies in what is intended and what is attempted. To deliberately end the life of a viable fetus is categorically different from delivering it and making an effort, however uncertain, to preserve its survival. Medicine already operates on this principle: premature infants are treated as patients, even when their odds are slim. No one claims their care is meaningless because many will not survive. The moral point is not that survival is guaranteed, but that society recognizes an obligation to try once independent existence is possible.

By framing post-viability abortion as the withdrawal of support, I am not denying that many such cases end in death. I am insisting that the moral and legal difference lies in whether death is the aim of the procedure or the unintended consequence of circumstances beyond control. That difference matters. It is the same difference the law draws between letting someone die by withdrawing life support and actively killing them. Both result in death, but one respects the principle that we may refuse to use our bodies as life support, while the other deliberately takes life. My framework seeks to preserve that distinction, not to obscure it.

“Health exceptions are too narrow.”

A recurring concern is that limiting exceptions to cases where the mother’s life is at risk sets the bar too high. Pro-choice advocates argue that health cannot be reduced to survival alone. Pregnancy can cause permanent damage to a woman’s body, from organ failure to loss of fertility, or leave her with chronic conditions that shorten or diminish the quality of her life. Mental health is also at stake. Depression, anxiety, or post-traumatic stress may not be immediately life-threatening, but they can devastate well-being and even lead to suicide. To treat these realities as secondary, critics say, is to trivialize forms of suffering that the law ought to take seriously.

I do not dismiss these concerns. Health is a broad concept, and the risks of pregnancy extend well beyond survival. But my position does not compel a woman to remain pregnant after viability. She may always choose to end the pregnancy. What changes at viability is not whether she may act, but how. At that stage, I believe the law should require delivery rather than destruction, with every effort made to preserve the life of the child if it can survive apart from her.

This reasoning is consistent with how society approaches life outside the womb. Raising a newborn can also impose serious harm—physical, emotional, and financial. Yet while the mother retains the freedom to seek help, transfer custody, or end her own role as caregiver, she is not permitted to end the child’s life as a solution to those harms. The same principle applies at viability. The burdens may remain profound, but the way of addressing them cannot include eliminating a life that can survive independently. By framing the exception narrowly around survival, I aim to preserve consistency with other points where the law protects the vulnerable while still recognizing the mother’s right to step away from the role of support.

“Bodily autonomy extends beyond viability.”

Another objection is that viability does not erase the physical demands of pregnancy and childbirth. Even if the fetus could survive outside the womb, ending a pregnancy after viability still requires medical intervention that puts the woman’s body at risk. Labor, cesarean delivery, or induction are not minor procedures; they involve pain, recovery, and potential complications. From this perspective, bodily autonomy does not end at viability, because the woman is still required to undergo something she may not wish to endure. Supporters of abortion rights argue that true autonomy means retaining the right to choose how to resolve a pregnancy, even if that means ending fetal life directly.

I understand this concern, and it highlights the unique burden pregnancy places on women. Yet here again I believe consistency matters. Bodily autonomy grants wide freedoms, but it does not extend to actively ending another life once that life is capable of existing apart. After viability, the woman’s autonomy is preserved in her ability to choose to end the pregnancy. What she loses is only the option of ending it in a way that intentionally destroys a separate, viable life. The law already recognizes limits on autonomy in other contexts: for example, parents cannot neglect or harm their children simply because caregiving imposes hardship, even when the hardship is significant. Likewise, after viability, a woman’s right to autonomy still allows her to step back, but not to resolve the conflict by eliminating the life that can exist without her.

The distinction is not meant to diminish the risks or challenges of delivery, which are real and sometimes serious. But once viability is reached, the question is no longer only about the woman’s body. It is also about a second life that has reached the threshold of independence. In that circumstance, I believe the balance must shift.

“Bodily autonomy extends beyond viability.”

Another objection is that viability does not erase the physical demands of pregnancy and childbirth. Even if the fetus could survive outside the womb, ending a pregnancy after viability still requires medical intervention that puts the woman’s body at risk. Labor, cesarean delivery, or induction are not minor procedures; they involve pain, recovery, and potential complications. From this perspective, bodily autonomy does not end at viability, because the woman is still required to undergo something she may not wish to endure. Supporters of abortion rights argue that true autonomy means retaining the right to choose how to resolve a pregnancy, even if that means ending fetal life directly.

This concern highlights the unique burden pregnancy places on women, but it overlooks an important fact: abortion procedures also carry risks. Especially in later stages, abortion can involve surgery, anesthesia, and the potential for complications including hemorrhage, infection, or damage to reproductive organs. In other words, there is no risk-free option once a pregnancy reaches viability. Both abortion and delivery involve medical intervention, and both carry physical consequences for the woman. The question, then, is not whether risk exists but how the law should weigh competing rights when risk is unavoidable.

For me, the distinction lies in proportionality. If one option carries significantly greater risk to the mother than the other, then her survival takes precedence, and the choice must rest with her. My framework has always placed the woman’s life at the center: the state cannot compel her to accept the greater risk to preserve the lesser. But when the risks are comparable, I believe the balance shifts toward protecting the life of the fetus once it can survive apart. In such cases, ending the pregnancy by delivery while making every effort to sustain the child recognizes both the woman’s autonomy and the unborn’s independent claim to life.

This approach does not minimize the physical cost to women, but it ensures that where survival is not at stake, the life of the viable fetus is given the same chance society affords to premature infants already born. In this way, bodily autonomy is preserved in the woman’s right to end the pregnancy, while consistency is preserved in how society protects vulnerable life once independence becomes possible.

“Disproportionate burdens remain.”

Another objection is that even if early pregnancy is left to the mother’s discretion and later pregnancy requires delivery rather than destruction, women still bear a disproportionate burden. Men will never face the physical risks of pregnancy, the pain of childbirth, or the recovery that follows. Even if custody can be transferred to others after delivery, women are the ones who must undergo the experience itself. From this perspective, any restriction on abortion simply magnifies a biological inequality and forces women to carry responsibilities men are exempt from.

This critique names something true but misstates its character. The difference between men and women in pregnancy is not a social construct imposed by law but a fact of biology. No legal system can erase the reality that reproduction happens within women’s bodies. To describe this as an injustice, as though the law were assigning unequal duties, is to confuse natural difference with legal discrimination. The law cannot make pregnancy a shared physical experience, but it can determine how society responds to the responsibilities it creates.

What balances this difference, in my view, is that the woman alone holds the authority to decide whether to continue offering her body as support. She may withdraw that support at any stage of pregnancy, and her survival always takes precedence in cases of risk. Before viability, withdrawing support ends the pregnancy and the embryo with it. After viability, withdrawing support still ends the pregnancy, but the law recognizes the unborn as capable of independent existence and therefore requires delivery rather than destruction. In both cases, the decision to act rests with her, and her life remains paramount. This framework acknowledges the biological imbalance without treating it as unjust, and it preserves consistency by giving women both authority and protection while also safeguarding viable life where possible.

“Potential for unequal enforcement.”

Another objection is that laws based on viability may not apply evenly. Viability is not a single universal point but depends on circumstances. A fetus might be considered viable in a fully equipped neonatal unit but not in a smaller clinic without comparable resources. In practice, this could mean two women at the same stage of pregnancy receive different answers depending on where they seek care. Timing also matters: a woman who presents herself a day before a statutory cutoff might be eligible, while another who arrives the next day finds her options closed. Critics argue this creates not only uncertainty but also inequity, with access hinging on factors that may feel arbitrary.

This concern is understandable, but it mischaracterizes what changes at viability. The woman’s options never disappear. At any stage of pregnancy, she may choose to end it. What changes is the unborn’s status: before viability, ending the pregnancy ends the fetus as well, because it cannot survive apart from her body. After viability, the pregnancy may still be ended, but the fetus must be delivered and given the chance to live if it can survive independently. The line does not take choice away from the woman; it extends protection to the unborn once survival without her body becomes possible.

Questions of medical capacity will always create some variation. But here the law should set a principle: viability, where reasonably possible, should be presumed in favor of the unborn. The determination should rest with a physician, not as an arbitrary judgment but under a standard of reasonable medical care. Just as doctors are bound by professional norms when diagnosing or recommending treatment, they can be bound by a duty to recognize viability when it is reasonably present. This avoids leaving women subject to personal whim while still ensuring the unborn is given the benefit of doubt once independence is possible.

Like any legal threshold, viability will create hard cases at the margins. But the alternative is to have no line at all, leaving the law without principle. By grounding the threshold in the transition from absolute dependence to possible independence, and by binding physicians to a reasonable-care standard, the law provides clarity, consistency, and fairness while still respecting the woman’s authority to decide when to withdraw her support.

“Risk of slippery slope back to total bans.”

Some supporters of abortion rights fear that any compromise which acknowledges rights of the unborn will be used as a stepping stone toward total prohibition. If viability becomes the legal threshold today, opponents may push to move it earlier tomorrow. Because viability has already shifted with advances in medicine, critics worry the line will continue to recede until abortion is effectively banned. From this perspective, even limited restrictions are seen not as stable but as vulnerable to erosion.

This fear, however, misreads both the history of the debate and the nature of my position. Continued argument over abortion does not necessarily reflect bad faith, but the persistence of deeply held convictions on both sides. For decades, there has been no real compromise at all, only a cycle of legal victories and reversals that left one side temporarily ascendant while the other sought to undo the result. It is to be expected that political engagement will continue, because neither side sees the matter as settled. That reality does not mean a principled standard cannot be set.

It is also important to distinguish between a total ban and the framework I propose. A total ban means a woman is legally prevented from ending a pregnancy at all. My position does not do that. At every stage, the woman retains the authority to withdraw her support. What changes at viability is not her freedom to act but the recognition that the unborn, now capable of survival apart from her body, must be delivered rather than destroyed. In effect, her choices remain intact, while society affirms the child’s right to live and takes on the responsibility of protecting that right if the child survives.

For the woman who does not wish to raise the child, this makes no difference—her role ends either way. But for society, the principle matters: life that can exist independently is not disposable. It carries rights that deserve recognition and protection. This distinction is crucial. The viability standard is not a path to prohibition, because it never removes the woman’s ability to end pregnancy. It is a compromise that respects her autonomy while also recognizing the unborn’s rights once survival becomes possible.

“Systemic inequality makes choice illusory.”

A further objection is that even if the law allows women to end pregnancy before viability, many do not have meaningful access to that choice. Poverty, lack of health insurance, geographic isolation, and systemic discrimination can all delay or block access to medical care. Women in rural areas may need to travel long distances for abortion services, and low-income women may lack the resources to do so in time. From this perspective, the viability framework does not provide real autonomy, because only those with resources and access can act on it.

There is no denying that disparities in healthcare access are a serious problem. But this is not unique to abortion. The same obstacles affect prenatal care, delivery, cancer treatment, and nearly every other form of medical service. My framework does not claim to resolve all inequities in healthcare—it cannot, and no legal definition of life ever will. The fact that some women face greater barriers to exercising their rights does not invalidate the principle that rights exist, or that society must balance the rights of women with the rights of the unborn.

Improving healthcare access is a broader societal duty, but it should not be conflated with the question of where the law draws the line between autonomy and the protection of life. Viability remains a principled threshold, regardless of how well or poorly healthcare systems function. The failure lies not in the standard itself but in the inequities of access that persist across all areas of medicine.

“Autonomy should be absolute — my body, my choice.”

Perhaps the most fundamental objection is that any limit on abortion undermines bodily autonomy. From this perspective, the fact that a pregnancy occurs within a woman’s body is decisive. No one else can be compelled to use their body to sustain another life, even if refusing means that life will end. Supporters of absolute autonomy argue that the same principle should apply here: because pregnancy uses the woman’s body, she must retain the authority to end it at any stage, for any reason. To impose limits is to treat her as less than fully sovereign over herself.

This argument carries weight, because autonomy is a cornerstone of individual freedom. In my framework, the woman’s autonomy is paramount throughout pregnancy. That principle does not change. At any stage, she has the right to decide whether to continue providing her body as support. What changes at viability is not her authority but the recognition that the unborn has acquired rights of its own, because it can now survive independently. Ending the pregnancy at that point should mean delivery rather than destruction.

Critics are right to note that delivery may involve risks. But abortion procedures at late stages also carry risks, and neither path is risk-free. As I have argued earlier, when one option presents significantly greater danger, the woman’s survival takes precedence, and the decision must rest with her. The viability standard does not override her autonomy; it ensures that when risks are comparable, the unborn’s right to live is also recognized.

This distinction preserves consistency. The woman never loses the ability to withdraw support. Her autonomy remains intact. But once the unborn reaches viability, society has a corresponding duty to recognize and protect its right to live. These two principles can coexist: autonomy governs the woman’s decision, and viability marks the point when the unborn can also claim protection.

“Abortion is a personal moral decision, not a legal one.”

Another objection is that abortion should be treated as a private moral matter rather than a legal question. Supporters of this view argue that people hold diverse beliefs about when life begins, shaped by religion, philosophy, or personal conviction. In a pluralistic society, no single perspective should be imposed on everyone. Just as the law does not dictate what religious faith a person must follow, it should not dictate how individuals resolve a question as intimate and contested as abortion. From this perspective, the role of law should be to leave room for personal conscience, not to set boundaries on it.

The difficulty with this objection is that it overlooks what pregnancy unavoidably involves: the creation of a new human life. The historical and continuing point of contention is not whether life is created, but when it should be recognized as having rights of its own. That question has fueled this debate from the beginning, and there is little reason to expect consensus will ever be reached. Still, most people would find it unreasonable to say life begins only at the moment of delivery. If it must begin somewhere before birth, then the question cannot be dismissed as purely personal—it necessarily raises competing claims between the woman and the child she carries.

My proposal addresses this directly. It recognizes life as beginning at conception in the biological sense, but it treats the entire pregnancy as a time in which two rights are in play: the woman’s right to self-determination and the unborn’s gradual claim to recognition. Before viability, the mother’s autonomy outweighs the dependent claim of the unborn. After viability, when the child can survive independently, the unborn’s right to live must be protected. Crucially, this framework never restricts the woman’s decision to end a pregnancy. What changes is only how that decision is carried out: before viability, ending the pregnancy ends the life with it; after viability, the pregnancy can still be ended, but through delivery rather than destruction.

This approach avoids leaving the question unresolved. It acknowledges the enduring disagreement over when life begins while setting a consistent legal standard: the mother’s survival and autonomy always come first, but the unborn’s rights are recognized once independence is possible.

“Severe abnormalities and suffering.”

Another objection is that a viability-based framework does not adequately account for cases of severe fetal abnormality. Some pregnancies involve conditions where the child, though technically viable in the sense of surviving outside the womb, faces little or no chance of meaningful life. These may include genetic disorders that cause death within hours or days, or conditions that require constant medical intervention without hope of recovery. Critics argue that forcing delivery in such cases imposes needless suffering on both the child and the parents. They contend that compassion requires allowing termination, even after viability, when survival is likely to mean only brief existence marked by suffering.

This objection deserves recognition, but I believe it should not be treated as a separate exception. Instead, it should be considered part of the viability determination itself. Viability should not be defined only by whether a fetus can survive outside the womb in the narrowest technical sense, but by whether survival is reasonably possible in medical terms. In cases where doctors agree there is no real prospect of sustained life, the mother and her physician should be free to make that decision together.

This approach keeps the framework consistent: it does not create categories of life judged “unworthy,” but it acknowledges that medical judgment must guide whether viability is genuine. Just as decisions at the end of life are left to families and doctors, decisions at the edge of viability should also be guided by compassion, expertise, and respect for the mother’s role. In this way, the law affirms its commitment to protecting life while recognizing that viability is a medical as well as a moral threshold.

From the Pro-Life Perspective

If many supporters of abortion rights may view my position as too restrictive, those who oppose abortion entirely may view it as far too permissive. From their perspective, the central principle is the sanctity of life. To recognize life as beginning at conception and yet permit abortion before viability may appear to them a contradiction. They could argue that my framework undermines the very value it claims to affirm by allowing the destruction of human beings in their earliest stages of development.

Some may object that conceding any ground to abortion weakens respect for life more broadly and risks normalizing the idea that some lives can be ended because they are inconvenient or dependent. Others may argue that drawing a line at viability places too much weight on technology and circumstance, treating human worth as conditional rather than inherent. Still others may contend that by allowing exceptions, I erode the moral clarity needed to defend the unborn consistently.

These objections must be taken seriously, because they come from a principled concern with protecting the most vulnerable. In what follows, I will outline the most pressing critiques from the pro-life perspective and explain why, though I acknowledge their force, I still believe the framework I have proposed is the most workable balance between competing rights.

“Permitting abortion before viability devalues life at conception.”

The most fundamental objection is that once life is acknowledged to begin at conception, abortion at any stage amounts to taking a human life. From this perspective, recognizing life but allowing it to be ended before viability is not just morally wrong but logically inconsistent. If the unborn is a living human being from conception onward, then the only consistent position is to protect it fully, with no exceptions other than to save the mother’s life. Anything less, critics argue, treats some lives as disposable and undermines the very principle that all life has inherent dignity.

This objection presses both a moral and a logical claim. The moral claim is straightforward: abortion equals killing, and killing the innocent is never justified. The logical claim follows: acknowledging life while permitting abortion amounts to affirming and denying the same principle at once. In this view, my framework is internally contradictory.

I accept the force of this challenge but reject the conclusion. Recognizing life at conception does not mean that rights can be applied in isolation from circumstance. The reality of pregnancy is that from conception to viability, the unborn’s survival is inseparably tied to the woman’s body. To prohibit abortion in those stages would not only affirm life but also impose on the woman an unprecedented legal duty: the obligation to use her body to sustain another life against her will. That is not demanded in any other context where saving a life requires bodily sacrifice.

My framework seeks to balance both claims. It affirms that life begins at conception and rejects the idea that unborn life is disposable. At the same time, it acknowledges the unique reality of pregnancy, where two rights collide in a way unlike any other. Before viability, the woman’s autonomy must prevail because the unborn cannot live apart from her. After viability, the unborn can exist independently, and its rights can then be recognized without erasing hers. This is not inconsistency; it is recognition that rights must be weighed in the real context where they come into conflict.

In this way, my framework offers consistency of a different kind: it consistently respects life at every stage while also consistently protecting the autonomy of the woman. Viability is not an arbitrary compromise, but the point where both rights can be upheld together rather than one being extinguished by the other..

“Viability makes human worth conditional.”

Another objection is that tying legal protection to viability treats human value as conditional rather than inherent. Critics may argue that worth is not something that emerges only when medicine is advanced enough to sustain life outside the womb. A child’s right to live, they would say, cannot depend on geography, technology, or the resources of a particular hospital. To base protection on such a shifting standard risks suggesting that human dignity is negotiable. From this perspective, life is valuable from its beginning, and drawing a line at viability undermines that principle.

This objection raises an important point: viability is not fixed. What counted as viable fifty years ago is different from today, and it varies depending on medical care available in a given place. Still, I believe the principle behind viability makes it more than a matter of circumstance. The significance of viability is not that it sets human worth, but that it marks the first stage where the unborn can exist without continuous use of the woman’s body. That transition—from absolute dependence on one particular person to the possibility of life supported by others—is unique. It creates the first point at which rights can be balanced in a way consistent with every other area of law, where we never compel one person to sustain another with their body against their will.

Critics may respond that I contradict this principle when I allow discretion in cases of severe abnormality. If viability is the line, they may argue, then it must apply consistently. To permit exceptions based on prognosis or impairment risks reintroducing the very conditionality I reject. Here, I see the tension but believe the distinction remains. My framework does not license the ending of life because it is judged “less worthy.” Instead, it acknowledges that viability itself must be a medical as well as a biological standard. In cases of profound genetic or neurological deformation, where doctors agree that survival outside the womb cannot meaningfully be sustained, the condition of viability has not truly been met.

In such circumstances, I believe the law should defer to medical judgment in consultation with the mother, much as it does at the end of life. Families already face agonizing decisions when loved ones suffer from irreversible conditions. The principle is not that their lives are less valuable, but that medicine recognizes when the capacity for sustained life has ceased. In the same way, when survival is medically impossible despite technical delivery, I see no contradiction in allowing the mother and her doctors to make the decision.

Viability, then, is not a measure of worth but of independence. The unborn’s dignity is constant, but society’s ability to protect it without overriding the mother’s autonomy emerges only when survival apart from her body is genuinely possible. That is why I place protection at viability, while recognizing that in some rare cases, medical reality means the line is not reached at all.

“Allowing exceptions undermines moral clarity.”

Another objection is that my framework erodes the moral clarity needed to defend unborn life. Pro-life advocates often argue that the strength of their position lies in its consistency: if life begins at conception, then abortion is always the deliberate ending of that life. To acknowledge life at conception while permitting abortion before viability, or to allow discretion in rare cases of abnormality, may be seen as sending mixed signals. Critics may say that once exceptions are allowed, the principle of sanctity is compromised and becomes negotiable. This, they argue, weakens the cultural and legal foundation needed to protect the most vulnerable.

I understand the appeal of moral clarity. It offers a bright line, a clear rule, and a sense of unshakable principle. But clarity is not the same as adequacy. A rule can be simple and absolute, yet fail to grapple with the complexity of reality. Pregnancy is unlike any other circumstance: it is the only situation where one life begins inside another, creating an overlap of rights that cannot be resolved by absolutes alone. To insist on an all-or-nothing approach may preserve clarity in words but at the cost of fairness in practice.

My framework seeks a different kind of integrity. It acknowledges the dignity of life from conception, but it also acknowledges the woman’s right not to have her body conscripted against her will. Before viability, the unborn cannot survive without her, and compelling her to sustain it would impose a duty we impose on no one else. After viability, when survival apart from her is possible, society can recognize the unborn’s rights without negating hers. Exceptions for medical judgment do not abandon the principle; they recognize that viability itself is a medical threshold, not an abstract line.

The result is not the simplicity of absolute prohibition, but the consistency of a rule that balances two rights throughout pregnancy. It avoids the rigidity of moral clarity that denies complexity, while offering a framework that can be applied with integrity even when circumstances are hard.

“Permitting abortion undermines respect for life in society at large.”

A further objection is that even limited acceptance of abortion corrodes respect for human life more broadly. Pro-life advocates may argue that once society allows the deliberate ending of life in the womb, it fosters a cultural logic that life can be treated as disposable whenever it is inconvenient, dependent, or imperfect. This reasoning often invokes the so-called “slippery slope”: if unborn life is not fully protected, why not extend the same reasoning to the disabled, the elderly, or others who rely on care for survival? From this perspective, abortion is not an isolated issue but a symptom of a broader erosion of reverence for human dignity.

This objection deserves consideration, because respect for life is not only about law but also about culture. My framework, however, does not treat life as disposable. It recognizes life from conception, yet recognition alone does not justify compelling one person to surrender her body to sustain another. The fact of life does not erase the fact of rights. Both exist, and they must be weighed together. Respect for life in this context means respecting the woman as well as the child she carries, rather than allowing the rights of one to wholly eclipse the other.

This balance explains why viability is decisive. Before viability, the unborn cannot survive apart from the woman; its dependence is absolute and inseparable. At that stage, her right to determine whether to continue offering support is paramount. After viability, the situation changes. The unborn is no longer inseparable from her body and has reached a stage where it possesses a genuine claim to life as an individual. At that point, its rights must be recognized and protected in law, not because society chooses to bestow them, but because they are inherent once independent survival becomes possible.

Seen in this light, my framework does not erode respect for life but reinforces it. It affirms that life begins at conception, acknowledges that autonomy and survival must be held together rather than placed in opposition, and establishes a standard by which the unborn’s rights are recognized when independence is possible. Far from encouraging disposability, this approach gives weight to both lives involved, ensuring that dignity and rights are preserved on each side of this unique and unavoidable conflict.

“Technology and circumstance make protection inconsistent.”

Another objection is that a viability standard makes the resolution of rights depend on technology and circumstance rather than principle. Critics may argue that in a modern neonatal unit, survival may be possible at 22 or 23 weeks, while in a less equipped facility it may not be until 26 or 27 weeks. A child’s protection, they contend, should not hinge on geography, available resources, or the sophistication of local hospitals. If the line is viability, then two children at the same stage of development might face different outcomes, not because of their humanity, but because of where their mothers sought care. For opponents, this seems arbitrary and unjust, as though the recognition of rights fluctuated with technology rather than applying equally to all.

This concern points to a real challenge, but it does not undermine the principle itself. The issue at stake is not whether rights exist—they do—but how to resolve the conflict between the rights of the mother and the rights of the unborn. Viability provides the first point at which those rights can be separated in practice: before that stage, the unborn’s survival requires continuous use of the mother’s body, while afterward, survival is possible without it. Technology affects where the line can be drawn in particular circumstances, but the underlying standard remains constant—viability marks the moment when the rights of two distinct individuals must both be considered.

Disparities in care will always exist, just as they do in every other area of medicine. The fact that premature infants fare better in some hospitals than in others does not mean we deny their right to treatment. Instead, the law should set a clear principle and require physicians to act under a standard of reasonable medical judgment. Where survival is reasonably possible, the unborn should be given the benefit of that doubt. In this way, the framework does not make rights contingent on technology, but uses viability as the point at which conflicting rights must be resolved in a consistent and principled way.

“Acknowledging autonomy weakens the case for life.”

Another objection is that by giving weight to the mother’s autonomy, my framework undercuts the very claim that life is sacred from conception. Opponents may argue that once life is recognized as beginning at conception, it follows that abortion at any stage is the deliberate ending of a human life and should be prohibited. Allowing early abortion, they contend, treats life as negotiable—protected only when convenient or when technology allows survival outside the womb. From this perspective, my position is inconsistent: it affirms life at conception but then permits its termination before viability. Critics may see this as a contradiction that undermines the moral clarity needed to uphold the value of life.

I acknowledge this tension openly, because it cannot be avoided. Recognizing life at conception does not resolve the issue; it creates it. From the moment life begins, the rights of the unborn come into potential conflict with the rights of the mother, and no position can eliminate that conflict. A framework that insists on protection from conception onward may claim consistency, but it does so at the cost of denying the mother any ability to decide whether to continue using her body to sustain that life. In my view, that places an unprecedented obligation on her—one we do not impose in any other circumstance where saving a life requires the direct use of another’s body.

The point of my framework is not to weaken the case for life, but to balance it with the equally real rights of the woman whose body is indispensable to its survival. Before viability, the unborn’s right to life cannot be separated from her right to self-determination, and in that conflict, her autonomy must prevail. After viability, the unborn’s right becomes enforceable independently, because it can survive without her body. This is not inconsistency; it is recognition that rights cannot be applied in the abstract but must be resolved within the unique realities of pregnancy.

In this way, the framework seeks to preserve respect for life while also respecting the autonomy of the woman. It does not treat life as negotiable, but as one of two competing rights that must both be given weight. What emerges is not contradiction but balance: life is affirmed from the beginning, and autonomy is preserved throughout, with viability serving as the point where the conflict between them can be resolved in law.

“Allowance for abnormalities invites exceptions.”

A further objection is that permitting consideration of severe fetal abnormalities undermines the consistency of the framework. Pro-life critics may argue that once exceptions are allowed, even in rare and tragic cases, the principle that all life deserves protection is weakened. They may say this opens the door to subjective judgments about which lives are worth living and which are not. If abortion is permitted because a child is expected to suffer, or because survival will be brief, then the same reasoning could eventually be applied more broadly to disabilities, chronic illness, or conditions judged undesirable. From this view, allowing exceptions for abnormalities risks sliding into a quality-of-life standard that treats some human lives as expendable.

I take this concern seriously, because the danger of misuse is real. That is why I do not frame abnormalities as a separate category of exception, but as part of the viability determination itself. Viability should mean the genuine possibility of sustained life outside the womb, not mere technical survival for a matter of hours or days. When physicians determine that survival cannot be achieved, the pregnancy may be ended because viability has not truly been reached—not because the child’s life is judged unworthy.

Some critics may respond that physicians could misuse this discretion by declaring non-viability too broadly. There will always be some subjectivity in these decisions, but that is true in every area of medicine. Determinations about death, disability, or medical futility also rest on professional judgment, and the law addresses this by requiring doctors to act within accepted standards of care. Viability can be approached in the same way: medical judgment is inevitable, but it must be responsible and accountable.

It is equally important to recognize that such decisions are not purely medical. Families are central participants, just as they are in end-of-life situations. Doctors provide expertise and guidance, but parents bear the weight of deciding how to proceed. The law should respect this shared role, ensuring families are fully involved while physicians remain bound by professional norms.

The goal here is not absolute consistency, because medicine rarely produces it. The goal is a framework that prevents misuse, respects the inherent value of life, and provides space for medical expertise and family judgment to work together. By handling severe abnormalities within the viability determination, the framework avoids creating new categories of lives deemed less worthy, while still addressing the tragic realities where survival is simply not possible.

Implementation

Outlining a principle is one thing; putting it into practice is another. If this framework is to serve as more than theory, it must be translated into clear standards that law, medicine, and society can apply. That requires a definition of life that is workable in law, a method for determining viability that does not depend on whim, and safeguards to ensure the rights of both the woman and the unborn are respected in real cases, not just in principle. The challenge of implementation is not to eliminate every gray area—that is impossible in medicine or law—but to provide a structure that guides decisions consistently while allowing room for professional judgment and personal responsibility.

Legal Definitions and Standards

For this framework to function, it must be enacted through binding law that provides both clarity and durability. The central definition is when life begins. I argue the law should state explicitly that human life begins at conception. But that recognition alone is not sufficient; the law must also define the stage at which that life acquires rights that can be enforced alongside the mother’s. Under this framework, that point is viability—the stage at which the unborn can survive outside the womb with medical support.

The clearest way forward is a federal statute, which would establish uniform standards across all states. Such a law would:

• Preserve the mother’s authority to end pregnancy at any stage, including the right to withdraw support whenever she decides, with her survival always taking precedence.
• Require physicians to make viability determinations using compulsory medical standards of reasonable care, just as they do for determinations of death or medical futility.
• Recognize human life as beginning at conception, while defining viability as the threshold at which the unborn’s rights become enforceable in law.

While a statute could achieve these aims, it would remain vulnerable to repeal or judicial reversal. The more durable path would be a constitutional amendment establishing the same principles at the constitutional level. This would fix in place the recognition of life, the primacy of the mother’s rights, and the viability standard as the threshold where the unborn’s rights must also be considered. In doing so, it would take the most contentious issue out of the cycle of political swings and provide a stable foundation for law and medicine alike.

Medical Judgment and Oversight

Even with clear legal standards, implementation ultimately turns on medical practice. Viability is not a fixed week of pregnancy but a medical determination that depends on the child’s development, available treatment, and the risks to the mother. For the framework to function fairly, physicians must be entrusted with this judgment, but not left without guidance or accountability.

The law should require that viability be assessed according to standards of reasonable medical care, similar to how medicine already defines death, disability, or medical negligence. These standards would be compulsory, not voluntary, and updated as knowledge and technology advance. Professional organizations such as the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) could establish and refine them under federal oversight, ensuring that determinations are consistent across the country.

Still, medicine always involves some subjectivity, and viability is no exception. To acknowledge this, the framework should require that decisions about viability be made with family involvement, not by physicians alone. Just as end-of-life decisions involve consultation between doctors and families, the same principle should apply here. Parents should have a central voice in cases of uncertainty, while physicians are bound to act within accepted medical norms.

Oversight would function on two levels. First, physicians would be accountable through ordinary professional mechanisms: peer review, hospital ethics committees, and state licensing boards. Second, because viability carries legal implications, courts must be able to review decisions when disputes arise, just as they already do in malpractice cases. This dual structure ensures that judgments remain both medically grounded and legally accountable.

The goal is not to eliminate every gray area, but to prevent misuse while respecting both the mother’s rights and the unborn’s claims once independence is possible. By combining medical expertise, family participation, and legal oversight, the framework ensures that viability is determined responsibly, with both lives taken seriously.

Enforcement and Practical Safeguards

No legal framework can succeed if it rests only on definitions; it must also provide mechanisms for enforcement. In abortion law, this is especially delicate. Enforcement must not become punitive toward women, nor should it criminalize medical professionals acting in good faith. At the same time, the framework must have real force to ensure that the balance of rights is respected in practice.

The first safeguard is clarity. Women must know what the law allows at every stage of pregnancy, and physicians must know what is expected of them. This avoids the uncertainty that currently drives fear of prosecution in some states and unrestricted access in others. Under this framework, the principle is straightforward: the mother always retains the authority to end a pregnancy, but after viability, the procedure must be carried out as delivery, with an obligation to attempt to preserve the life of the child if survival is possible.

The second safeguard is accountability. Physicians should be required to document viability assessments in medical records, along with the basis for their determination. If a decision is later challenged, this record provides transparency for review. Oversight bodies, such as hospital ethics committees or licensing boards, should be responsible for addressing disputes in the first instance, with courts as the final arbiter when necessary. This mirrors existing processes in other areas of medical law, such as malpractice or end-of-life care.

The third safeguard is proportionality. Enforcement should focus on ensuring compliance, not punishing women for seeking care. Penalties for violations, where they occur, should fall on institutions or providers who deliberately ignore medical standards, not on patients acting within the framework. In this way, the law protects both lives without turning pregnancy into a field of criminal liability for women themselves.

Finally, enforcement must be coupled with support. If the unborn child survives delivery after viability, responsibility for its care cannot fall back on the mother who chose to withdraw support. Public systems must be prepared to assume responsibility, whether through adoption services, foster care, or direct state protection. This ensures that recognizing the rights of the unborn does not translate into added burdens for the mother, but into societal recognition of its inherent claim to life.

Adapting to Technology and Future Developments

Any framework for abortion must be able to evolve as science advances. Viability is not a fixed point; over the past fifty years, it has shifted earlier as neonatal medicine has improved. Looking ahead, new technologies—such as artificial wombs, advanced fetal surgery, or genetic interventions—may alter the boundaries even further. A law that freezes viability at a specific week risks becoming outdated within a decade.

The strength of this framework is that it defines viability not by calendar weeks but by principle: the point at which the unborn can survive apart from the woman’s body. Medicine then supplies the criteria for determining when that threshold is reached. As technology advances, those criteria can be updated without requiring the law itself to be rewritten. This ensures the standard remains durable while still adapting to reality.

There is also the possibility that technology will blur the line between pregnancy and independent survival in entirely new ways. For example, if artificial wombs become practical, viability could shift back to the earliest stages of development. Such advances would create ethical questions that society has not yet faced: if independence from the mother’s body is possible almost immediately, what balance of rights remains? The framework anticipates this by focusing on principles rather than fixed numbers, but future debates would need to grapple with the cultural, medical, and legal consequences of such technologies.

The law cannot predict every advance, but it can set a structure capable of absorbing them. By defining life at conception, prioritizing the mother’s right to withdraw support, and recognizing the unborn’s rights once survival is possible, the framework provides flexibility without surrendering clarity. Whatever technologies emerge, the principle remains the same: autonomy and life must both be respected, and viability marks the point where they can be weighed together.

Conclusion

At its core, abortion is a conflict between two rights that cannot be ignored. One is the woman’s right to decide what happens with her own body. The other is the unborn child’s right to live. Every other claim in this debate grows out of these two foundations. They are not easily reconciled, but neither can be dismissed. Any framework that hopes to endure must face both directly and hold them in balance.

The framework I have proposed begins by affirming both. The woman may always choose to end a pregnancy, and her survival and safety must always come first. The unborn is recognized as life from conception, and from that point its claim to protection is real. The question is how those rights interact, and where the line should be drawn between them.

Viability provides the answer. Before viability, the unborn cannot exist apart from the mother’s body, and protecting its claim at that stage would require compelling her to continue sustaining it with her body. For this reason, her autonomy outweighs. After viability, the unborn can survive independently, and its right to life must be respected alongside hers. Ending pregnancy at this stage should mean delivery rather than destruction, with viability determined by medical judgment under a standard of reasonable care, in consultation with the woman and her family.

This approach offers a way forward. Women remain secure in their authority and dignity, never compelled to remain pregnant against their will. The unborn is recognized as life from the start, and its protection grows as its capacity for independence grows. The law gains a principle that is consistent, humane, and capable of guiding practice without the constant reversals of the past.

The debate will never vanish, because the questions it raises touch the deepest matters of life, responsibility, and freedom. But a framework built on these principles can steady the law, respect both rights, and allow society to live with the tension rather than deny it. That is the most we can expect from law in so difficult a matter, and it is enough to provide a path that is both just and durable.